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Abstract: Due to the recent debate about income inequality, the need to find its determinants has 
never been more important. Economic integration has recently entered the discussion as one 
possible force for inequality. By looking at the eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) as 
an example of economic integration I am able to analyze the relationship between economic 
integration and within-country income inequality. The focus will be on the Central and East 
European Countries (CEEC) and the outcome of them being integrated into the EU. The analysis 
covers the years between 1995 and 2013 where economic integration is decomposed into potential 
integration and realized integration. My findings suggest that becoming a member of the EU has 
increased income inequality for the CEECs, while additional member countries have increased 
income inequality for the EU15. Therefore, economic integration does seem to increase income 
inequality in Europe.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Everyone seems to be interested in the debate about inequality. Inequality, referring to a gap 
between the rich and the poor has been up for discussion for a long time but has gained an 
incredible amount of attention the last couple of years. The U.S Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen 
is ”greatly concerned”, president Barack Obama wants to raise taxes and said that the current 
income gap is ”the defining challenge of our time”, the French economist Thomas Piketty wrote a 
book and even the Pope has engaged himself in the debate (Deprez, 2015; Brooks, 2014). What is it 
about the concept of inequality that makes people so concerned? Inequality can refer to a lot of 
things. It is often used as a term targeting concepts that seem to have a negative effect on 
individuals. Poverty, class division, racial division and unemployment are some examples. 
However, the recent debate has focused more on income inequality and its impact on the overall 
economy. The OECD reported that the income gap between rich and poor is at its highest level 
since 30 years and that the richest 10 percent of the population in the OECD earn 9.5 times the 
income of the poorest 10 percent (Cingano, 2014).  
 
The current debate leads us to the determinants of income inequality. Globalization has generally 
been considered a strong force for economic development and poverty reduction. However, for 
example Dollar & Kraay (2001) and Milanovc (2005) argues that globalization in terms of trade 
openness and liberalization does indeed create opportunities for poverty reduction and economic 
growth but it comes with negative effects such as polarization, power shifting and income 
inequality. There is a large literature looking into the relationship between globalization and income 
inequality and the literature mostly point out a negative connection between the two. While 
globalization seems to increase income inequality, what about deeper integration? Economic 
integration between countries refers to a conscious political process of removing barriers. 
Globalization, on the other hand is not a political process but mostly refers to the removal of tariffs 
and border controls (IMF, 2008). A great example of economic integration is that of the European 
Union. One of the main goals of the EU is to unify nations by bringing them closer in terms of 
social, economic and political integration. Today, the union consists of 28 member countries.
1
 The 
largest expansion of the EU so far took place in 2004 and 2007 by stretching out to the Central and 
East European Countries (CEEC).
2
 These countries differed in many ways from the current Western 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
2
 Central and East European Countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Poland and Romania. The two other countries joining were Cyprus and Malta.  
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members. Emerging from planned economy, dictatorship and closed boundaries to the rest of the 
world, hopes of economic growth, poverty reduction and reduced income inequality was one of 
many reasons behind the membership. 
 
In this paper I will use the integration process of the EU with a special focus on the eastern 
enlargement as an example of economic integration. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to look 
at the relationship between economic integration and income inequality as well as the outcome of 
the eastern enlargement especially for the CEECs, but also for the old member countries, the 
EU15.
3
 My analysis covers the years between 1995 and 2013. While previous research on 
inequality has focused mainly on the impact of globalization, economic development and trade 
openness (Reuveny & Li, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004), I will focus on economic integration. My 
analysis is inspired by the work of Beckfield (2006) and Bouvet (2010) who both looks at different 
kinds of integration processes in the EU and their effect on income inequality. For my main analysis 
I will use the approach of Bouvet (2010), who used dummy variables controlling for certain 
integration processes, to look at potential integration which refers to the removal of barriers 
between economies, making further integration possible. I will be able to assess the impact of 
economic integration on income inequality for the CEECs but I will also look at the effect on the 
old member countries. As a robustness check I will look at realized integration. This approach is 
inspired by the work of Beckfield (2006). Realized integration refers to the actual change in flows 
of goods, factors of production and labor as a result of the removal of barriers. In this paper I will 
be able to contribute both to the literature on the determinants of income inequality and the 
literature on the outcome of the eastern enlargement. A further expansion of the EU is just around 
the corner as several candidate countries are waiting for permission to join. Most of these countries 
are eastern countries which indicate that further expansions will continue in that direction. 
European policy makers will therefore benefit from knowing the outcome of the eastern 
enlargement, as it most likely will happen again.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I will present the dimensions and measures of 
inequality and further present my dependent variable. Section 3 goes through the integration 
process of the EU and the CEEC while section 4 presents some previous literature on income 
inequality. Section 5 lays out the theoretical background allowing me to state my hypothesis. 
                                                 
3
 I have excluded Slovakia from the CEEC sample due to data availability in the dependent variable. Cyprus and Malta 
who entered the union in 2007 have also been excluded due to characteristics differing from the CEECs. When I refer to 
the old member countries and a period after the CEEC joined the union, I refer to the EU15. Otherwise, EU will be 
used.  
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Section 6 describes the data used as well as the methodology for the analysis and section 7 presents 
the results. Thereafter, a discussion will follow while I end with my conclusion.  
2. Dimensions and measures of inequality 
 
Measures of inequality has been a topic of considerable importance as well as of interest the last 
couple of decades for both sociologists and economists as some countries seem to become more or 
less unequal (Allison, 1978). Generally, inequality refers to the unequal distribution of opportunities 
(Díaz-Giménez et al. 1997). These opportunities could be talents, earnings, income and 
consumption and so on. The concept of inequality is thus to compare two distributions of an 
attribute and is measured irrespective of the median or mean value of the population (Atkinson, 
1970; World Bank, 2003). Unfortunately, the word inequality in itself does not say much about the 
ranking of two different unequal distributions but only that they differ in some way from each other. 
The conventional approach in measuring inequality has therefore been to use some summary 
statistic of the attribute, such as the variance, the coefficient of variation or measures such as the 
Gini coefficient to separate between two distributions. 
 
Perhaps the most common attribute of measuring inequality is by using monetary variables such as 
earnings, income or wealth (World Bank, 2011). Inequality can also be measured for non-monetary 
variables, such as land, assets or any continuous and cardinal variables (World Bank, 2003). 
However, a large part of the literature about inequality concerning economic and social variables 
refers to income inequality (Barro, 2000; Beckfield, 2006; Bergh & Nilsson, 2007; Bertola, 2010; 
Dollar & Kraay, 2001; Escurra et al, 2005; Heidenreich & Wunder, 2008; Heshmati, 2004; Kentor, 
2001; Reuveny & Li, 2003; Wade, 2004). Income is perhaps most easy to measure of the three 
monetary variables and is generally the most dispersed among populations. Income refers to all 
kinds of revenue before taxes, such as labor earnings, dividends, unemployment compensation or 
child support Earnings are usually only referred to labor earnings while wealth is the net worth of 
households which can be all kinds of material objects owned by individuals (Díaz-Giménez et al., 
1997).  
2.1 Qualities and measures of inequality 
There are several indicators of income inequality. Basic dispersion measures are for example 
dispersion ratios, which measures the distance between two groups in the distribution of income by 
dividing the average income of the x percent of the richest by the average income of the x percent of 
the poorest. The most common dispersion ratio is the decile ratio which looks at the top and bottom 
10 percent of a population (World Bank, 2003). The advantage of this measure is that it is easily 
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interpreted. On the other hand it is sensitive and vulnerable to extreme values and outliers which 
can bias the measure. Another basic measure is to look at the share of income of the poorest in 
relation to the total income in the population.
4
 This measure is also easily interpreted, however, it 
only concerns the poor and is insensitive to what happens in higher parts of the income distribution.  
 
Aggregate measures of inequality are more complex as they take into account more factors. 
However, they are expected to satisfy a number of qualities. (1) Mean independence: if income 
were doubled for all individuals, this measure should not change. (2) Population size independence: 
if the population were doubled but income distribution the same, the measure should not change. (3) 
Symmetry: if two individuals would change income patterns with each other, the measure should 
not change. (4) Principle of transfers (Pigou-Dalton): if richer individuals would transfer income to 
poorer individuals, the measure should decrease. (5) Decomposability: total inequality should be 
possible to decompose into population groups, income source or other dimensions.  
 
The Gini coefficient 
The most commonly used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient which measures the 
within-country inequality (World Bank, 2011). The Gini coefficient is measured as half the average 
of all pairwise absolute deviations between individuals, relative to the mean income (World Bank, 
2003). 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
2𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝑦
 
  
here yi and yj are individual incomes with the mean y and n is the total number of individuals. The 
Gini coefficient can also be calculated from the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz Curve maps the income 
distribution for a group of individuals or a country. Depending on how uneven the income 
distribution is, the further away will the Lorenz Curve be from the 45 degree perfect equality line. 
Graph 1 shows two different Lorenz curves. The thin black line is more unequal than the dashed 
equality line. Here, 40 percent of the population only holds about 20 percent of total income. The 
thick black line is the line of total inequality where one individual holds 100 percent of total 
income. Using the Lorenz framework, the Gini coefficient is determined by the area, A, between the 
perfect equality line and the Lorenz Curve, in relation to A and B: 
 
                                                 
4
 The definition of income poverty is when the income of a household fails to meet an established threshold that differs 
across countries (UN, 2014).  
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𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
𝐴
𝐴 + 𝐵
 
 
Figure 1: Lorenz curves 
 
 
For perfect equality the Gini coefficient becomes a zero as everyone has the same income. For total 
inequality the Gini coefficient takes on the value of 1 as one individual holds all income and all 
others none (World Bank, 2011). One of the advantages of the framework using the Lorenz curve is 
that is generates a single summary statistic of the income distribution. The Gini coefficient is easily 
computed and easily interpreted and satisfy all the qualities of an aggregate inequality measure, 
except for one. It fails for the decomposability quality. It has the disadvantage of not being 
representable for the addition of subgroups and cannot capture the between effects, only within 
effects. Moreover, many studies might have a special interest of inequality in the lowest or highest 
areas of the income distribution while the Gini coefficient only gives a measure of the total 
population. It therefore gives an equal weight to individuals irrespective of them being in the top or 
bottom of the income distribution (World Bank, 2003). As this study does not focus on any 
particular area of the income distribution but on overall inequality, this should not be of any 
problem. 
 
Atkinson Index and Generalized Entropy Indices 
The Atkinson index is an inequality measure built on the concept of Equally Distributed Equivalent 
(EDE) income. For a society to reach the same level of welfare each of its individuals needs to 
obtain the EDE level of income (De Maio, 2007). The Atkinson index indicates how much income 
each individual has to give up in order for everyone to have equal incomes. For example, an 
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Atkinson index of 0.20 indicates that society could achieve the same level of social welfare with 
only 80 percent of income.  
 
Generalized entropy (GE) indices is another well used family of income inequality measures. It can 
take values between 0 and infinity, where 0 represents a state of perfect equal distribution while 
higher values being increases in inequality. An advantage with the GE indices is that they are 
decomposable and can be divided into subgroups. This enables researchers to obtain both the 
between- and within country inequality effects. 
 
  𝐺𝐸(𝛼) =  
1
𝛼2−𝛼
 {
1
𝑁
∑ (
𝑦𝑖
𝑦
)
𝛼
− 1𝑁𝑖=1 } 
 
Both the Atkinson index and GE index uses a sensitivity parameter (𝛼). This parameter decides how 
sensitive the index will be to either the upper tail of the income distribution (positive and large 𝛼) or 
the lower tail of the income distribution (positive and small 𝛼 ). The Atkinson and GE index 
therefore allows for analysis in different areas of the income spectrum. However, the GE index has 
a difficult interpretation unlike the Gini coefficient and is also sensitive to overall changes in the 
distribution.  
 
All inequality measures mentioned so far are single parameter measures, focusing on one attribute 
such as income or expenditure. Another branch of literature on the subject of income inequality 
measures have focused instead on multidimensional inequality measures. These measures are 
including other variables than only the monetary perspective in inequality analysis. Examples of 
non-monetary measures are education, health and land. The argument behind is that individuals and 
households have different characteristics and needs and cannot be explained by only one 
perspective (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 1982). There are several measures of multidimensional 
inequality. One of them is an index developed by Maasoumi (1986). In his approach an individual 
is represented by a utility function of all the different attributes and not only one. This function is 
called the ‘aggregate’ attribute and is used to compose a univariate distribution up on which the GE 
indices then can be applied (Maasoumi, 1986). 
 
There are limitations to most measures of income inequality. However, I am aware of today’s broad 
field of income inequality measures but I have chosen to work with the Gini coefficient throughout 
this analysis. This is due to its wide use in similar literature and also due to it being straightforward 
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both in its calculation and interpretation. For future work and when more time is given, other 
measures of income inequality could be used as robustness checks or be analyzed closer.  
3. The integration of the CEECs 
 
Previous work in the field of income inequality tends to focus on the impact of globalization or 
economic openness. However, as stated above, these two differ from economic integration in the 
sense that economic integration is a conscious political process to eliminate barriers between 
countries.  Globalization refers more to an increased movement of goods, services, capital and labor 
across borders and is a historical process that has simplified these kinds of flows by innovation and 
technological progress (IMF, 2008). Globalization may even refer to for instance the access of 
internet simplifying trade between countries. Economic openness is usually measured by national 
trade flows and is an indicator promoting competition in national and international markets 
(Reuveny & Li, 2003). The integration within the EU refers to much more than the classical 
shallow integration such as removing tariffs and border controls. It is a deeper kind of integration 
setting common rules for example for foreign investors, product standards, competition policies and 
labor and environmental standards (Lawrence, 1996).
5
 The aim of this paper will be outcome of the 
eastern enlargement where main focus will be given to the CEECs. A summary of the creation and 
the development of the EU will be given in table 1 while the rest of this section lays out the 
integration process of the CEECs. 
 
Table 1: The development of the European Union 
Year Integration Countries Column1 
1951 The Coal and Steel Treaty 
EU6: Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg 
The coal and steel industries were 
run under a common agreement to 
prevent single countries making 
weapons and turn against others.  
1957 The Treaty of Rome EU6 
The formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). A 
step toward a supranational Europe 
where countries gave up some of 
their sovereignty for a closer 
European community. Creation of a 
common market where people, 
goods and services could move 
freely across borders.  
                                                 
5
 Regional integration is also one of the “deeper” kinds of integration. The European Commission defines it as a process 
where a group of countries liberalize trade by creating free trade areas or customs unions. It this sense, it is 
geographically bound. Some argue that the integration process of the European Union is referring regional integration 
(Baldwin, 2006; Beckfield, 2006; Mansfield & Milner, 1999). Nevertheless, the focus in this paper will not be on 
regional level, but on a specific group of countries.  
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1973   
EU9: United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Ireland joined 
  
1979 European Parliament   
EU citizens can elecet members of 
the european Parliament for the first 
time.  
1981   EU10: Greece joined   
1986 The Single European Act 
EU12: Spain and Portugal 
joined 
A six year programme was 
launched to remove the main 
obstacles for free trade.  
1992 The Treaty of European Union EU12 
Treaty signed in Maastricht setting 
rules for common foreign security 
policies, closer cooperation in 
justice and home affairs. Decision 
to form the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The EEC 
became the European Union.  
1993 The Single Market EU12 
Establishment of the single market: 
fee movement of goods, services, 
people and money 
1994-
1998 
The Europe Agreement 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
The goals of the Eas are to 
encourage integration of goods 
markets by eliminating tariffs as 
well as promoting political 
integration between the EU and the 
eastern countries 
1995 Schengen Agreement 
EU15: Austria, Finland and 
Sweden joined 
Seven of the member countries 
were affected by the new 
agreement. Travelers of these 
nationalities could travel freely 
across their borders without any 
passport control.  
2002 The Euro entered the market 
The Eurozone (in 2014): 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
The aim of the Eurozone was to 
reduce trading costs by removing 
exchange rate risks and to boost the 
EU market by price transparency 
and reduced price discrimination. 
2004   
EU25: Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia joined 
  
2007 Treaty of Lisbon 
EU27: Bulgaria and Romania 
joined  
The treaty was designed to increase 
democratic decision making, 
efficiency and transparency in the 
union. It laid out guidelines how to 
tackle climate change and 
sustainable development.  
2013   EU28: Croatia joined   
Source: Official website of the European Union. 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm 
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The CEEC emerged from communist ruled societies, planned economy and dictatorship. This 
created trade barriers towards the rest of the world as well as slow economic growth compared to 
the Western European countries (Cadot et al., 1995; Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). In 1993, the 
European Council announced intentions to extend the EU to the east. The new candidates would be 
the CEECs, who mutually expressed desires to join the union. The benefits of this enlargement 
would be political, economic as well as cultural. The EU argued for peace and stability as well as 
access to new markets, thereby boosting economic growth for both new and old member countries 
(European Commission, 2002). This intention towards the east did not lead straight away to official 
memberships but instead to the Europe Agreements (EA). The EAs was a treaty between the EU 
and a non-member country allowing for closer cooperation. The aims of the EAs were to encourage 
integration of goods markets by eliminating tariffs and promoting political integration. The first 
country to receive an EA was Hungary in 1994. Thereafter, 9 other CEECs received the agreement 
during the later half of the 90th century. The EAs were no substitutes for an official membership 
but more of a preparation for further integration. The effects of the EAs seem to have been reduced 
trade both within the EU15 and the CEEC, while increased trade between the two. The CEEC also 
seems to have experience a rather large increase in their GDP and welfare (Egger & Larch, 2011). 
 
The real negotiations for official membership began in 1998 with five of the CEECs (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). These five countries were chosen based on their 
capacity of bringing their economic, political and legal systems closer to the EU norms. The second 
group of countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia needed to bring their 
economies closer to EU standards before any negotiations could take place. The intention of an 
eastern enlargement was again met with mixed reactions whether the costs would exceed the 
benefits. Excluding the eastern countries could on the one hand hinder the eastern economic 
transition; on the other hand an economic failure in the east could threaten the peace and prosperity 
in the EU (Baldwin, et al., 1997). Some member countries feared that they would lose regional aid 
from EU such as France who was worried to lose subsidies for their agricultural sector. Moreover, 
there were fears of potential large-scale immigration of job seekers. Germany and Austria sharing 
borders with some of the candidates feared this the most. This fear of large-scale immigration was 
built upon the idea that cheaper, unemployed workers from the CEECs would take over many of the 
jobs in EU and reduce wages of the native workers (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999). 
 
Nevertheless, in 2004 eight of the ten CEECs officially joined the EU followed by the last two, 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The CEECs integration into the EU has surprised many analysts as 
the interdependence between the EU and the CEECs is highly asymmetrical. The preaccession 
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process requires applicant countries to adopt to EU standards, EU laws and systems to be accepted. 
The requirements for the CEECs have therefore been massive as well as nonnegotiable. Compared 
to previous enlargements, the EU has not been this complex for any other country (Moravcsik & 
Vachudova, 2003). The CEECs has been forced to develop a market economy from the ground and 
to build a modern regulatory state to be capable of implementing EU standards while the majority 
of the EU15 had half a century to do this. The interdependence becomes even clearer when 
comparing the collective Gross National Product (GNP) of the ten CEEC with the GNP of the EU. 
The CEEC only covers between 3 to 5 percent of the EU15, which is less than any other 
enlargement of the union except for Greece (Baldwin et al. 1997; Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). 
The importance of the CEECs becoming members is rather small from the EU point of view 
expressed in economic terms. For the CEECs, on the other hand, becoming members means more 
than just an increased market access. As the initial integration in terms of EAs showed a large 
increase in their GDP and welfare, a further step in the integration process may have benefited the 
CEECs even more. Emerging from societies very different from the rest of the EU, a membership 
could be one way to face some of the challenges of adapting to the Western European standards. 
4. Previous Research 
There is a large literature covering income inequality from various perspectives. One of the key 
determinants has been globalization and has therefore been the main focus in the literature. Other 
determinants such as economic openness or economic development have also been covered (Bergh 
& Nilsson, 2007; Reuveny & li, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). These variables have so far been viewed 
as the main forces driving national income inequality in advanced capitalist countries. Dreher & 
Gaston (2008), analyze the relationship between globalization and income inequality. They argue 
that the current literature is somewhat limited as it focuses on more measurable dimensions of 
economic globalization and market integration while globalization is instead multifaceted. So 
instead of only looking at the effects of liberalizing international trade, they include dimensions 
such as social institutions and political integration. They find evidence that globalization has 
exacerbated income inequality and that this effect is particularly strong for OECD countries. 
Meanwhile, they found no impact of globalization on income inequality in less-developed nations. 
Similarly, Barro (2000) finds that greater openness to trade increases income inequality and that this 
result is more pronounced in poor countries. Milanovic (2005), also show evidence that the income 
share of the poor will be smaller in countries that trade more. His conclusion is that the poor, who 
according to theory should be the beneficiaries from increased trade seems to be the losers. Kentor 
(2001) and Wade (2004) both argue that globalization is a multidimensional concept. They state 
that one cannot simply conclude whether globalization is good or bad for countries, but that it needs 
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to be decomposed into its various components for analysis. Wade (2004), further analyze the global 
income inequality patterns and concludes that inequality has rather increased that the opposite and 
that globalization therefore cannot have a positive relationship with income inequality. Much of the 
literature on the impact of globalization on income inequality points in the direction of increased 
income gaps between people.  
4.1 The relationship between economic integration and income inequality 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a similar example of deeper integration as 
the European Union, but is an agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico that went 
into force in 1994. NAFTA has created a free trade block and eliminated most tariff and non-tariff 
trade barriers (NAFTA, 2013). It is one of the world’s largest free trade zones which are upheld by 
a number of institutions and a great example of deeper integration between countries. Esquivel 
(2011), has analyzed the income inequality patterns in Mexico since 1994 and have found that there 
has been a large reduction in income inequality. He argues that the widely documented increase in 
inequality between 1984 and 1994 has been completely reversed. The main contributor to this 
change has been labor income. Labor income has been an equalizing force in urban areas while 
public transfers have been most important in rural sectors. Furthermore, public remittances have 
been a national contributor to the reduction in inequality. Esquivel concludes that these inequality 
reducing effects are due to a more educated workforce as well as trade with more skill-abundant 
countries. 
 
Heidenreich & Wunder (2008), analyze the patterns of regional income inequality of the EU 
between mid-1990s until the entry of the CEEC in 2004. They find that the within-country 
inequalities have increased by 15 percent over the period while the between-country income 
inequalities have decreased by 45 percent. The authors argue that on the on hand, increased 
economic liberalization and integration has pushed up regional income inequality levels and 
contributed to an increasing economic heterogeneity within countries. On the other hand, the EU as 
a whole has created a relatively homogenous political, social and economic union which has 
contributed to the large reduction in between-country income inequality. Furthermore, they look at 
the determinants of the regional inequality patterns and state that labor market and economic 
structures has a substantial impact on the regional income levels. Finally, they refer to a future 
dilemma that lies ahead of the EU: on the one hand the Europeanization of the economy threatens 
the similar living conditions within the member states, while on the other hand it contributes to the 
reduction of between-country inequality. Similarly, Ezcurra et al. (2005), analyze the distribution 
dynamics of regional per capita income in the EU between 1977 and 1999. They refer to 
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distribution dynamics as inequality, polarization and mobility in regional per capita income 
distribution. Their results show an overall reduction in regional inequality over the period and the 
largest part of the reduction could be seen in the end of the 1970s. Regional polarization was also 
shown to have decreased over the period.  
 
Bouvet (2010), looks at the relationship between the EMU and 197 European regions between 1977 
and 2003 to assess the interregional income inequality patterns. He finds a downward trend during 
the period, indicating that the overall income inequality has decreased. Moreover, he finds that the 
within-country inequality was relatively stable throughout the period while the between-country 
inequality has decreased. This reduction in between-country inequality seems to be driven by the 
cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) converging to the rest of the EU. Bouvet then turns 
to an empirical analysis where he looks at the relationship between the EMU and EU regional 
policy and interregional income inequality by conducting a panel data analysis with within-country 
inequality as the dependent variable. To control for the EU integration he creates three dummy 
variables for each stage of the EMU. The first dummy is the adoption of a common currency, the 
second is the Maastricht Treaty and the third is the Stability and Growth Pact. Here he finds that the 
first two dummy variables are associated with an increase in inequality while the third is associated 
with a reduction. His conclusion is that there seems to be an overall decrease in inequality. 
 
Beckfield (2006), focus on two types of regional integration and their relationship to income 
inequality for 12 Western European countries between 1973 and 1997. Beckfield’s study was the 
first to look at the effect of regional political and economic integration on income inequality in 
Western Europe. The two types of regional integration are regional economic integration and 
regional political integration. By conducting a random as well as a fixed effect analysis for the 
EU12 he finds that economic and political integration increases income inequality. Beckfield 
further argues that the central point in his study is that not only national and global processes but 
also regional integration needs to be taken into account when working with income inequality. He 
concludes by stating that regional integration is actually more powerful than globalization when it 
comes to recent trends in income inequality in Western European countries.  
 
To my knowledge, there are only very few attempts made to assess the impact of economic 
integration on income inequality in Europe. The study by Beckfield (2000) was the first to look at 
this relationship while Heidenreich & Wunder (2008) and Bouvet (2010) have followed with 
similar studies. However, Beckfield looked at a time period between 1973 and 1997 while 
Heidenreich and Wunder focused on the mid-90s until 2004. Bouvet chose to focus on the years 
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between 1977 and 2003. The time spans of these studies are not stretching far enough to capture the 
effect from the eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007. Heidenreich and Wunder do include the 
CEECs in their sample, but as their analysis end before the official entry of the eastern countries it 
is unlikely to capture any of the effects from the enlargement. Therefore, there is a gap in the 
literature regarding the relationship between the European economic integration and income 
inequality. My analysis will be able to capture the effect the eastern enlargement as my time span 
stretches between 1995 and 2013. Hopefully, this will shed some more light on the relationship 
between economic integration and income inequality and tell us more about the outcome of the 
extension towards the east.  
5. Theoretical background 
 
To be able to analyze the relationship between economic integration and income inequality there is 
need for a theoretical foundation. I will base my hypothesis on two theories. The first is the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of what happens when countries open up for trade. The H-O is 
composed by four theorems, however, only two of them will be used in this analysis: The Factor-
Price-Equalization Theorem and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. The second model is the theory 
of International Labor Mobility that offers and explanation for what happens when labor can move 
freely across borders. The discussion of both models is following the work by Krugman & Obstfeld, 
(2009). 
5.1 Heckscher-Ohlin 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model offers an easy explanation for the effects when countries open 
up for trade in its two country, two production factors and two goods model.
6
 The model points out 
that comparative advantages or differences in factor endowments are causes of international trade. 
Countries are equipped with factors in different proportions and tend to focus their industry to the 
most abundant factor. Therefore, countries will have different relative marginal costs of production 
and cause countries to export the good which is produced by the country’s abundant factor more 
intensively.
7
 The H-O model begins with the example of a closed economy called East.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The H-O model has been given great contributions and extensions by P.A Samuelson and is therefore sometimes 
called the Heckcher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. In this analysis, for simplicity I will refer to the model as the H-O model.  
7
 The model builds on several assumptions: perfect competition, free trade, no transport costs, international immobility 
of factors, full employment, constant returns to scale and identical demand functions in both countries.  
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The Closed Economy 
There are two factors of production, high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor, H and L, and a series 
of goods, z, that is produced in East.
8
 The supply of high and low-skilled labor is fixed but East has 
a comparative advantage of low-skilled labor. The series of goods, z, can be arranged in order of 
decreasing high-skilled intensity of production such that 1 is the most high-skilled intensive and n is 
the most low-skilled intensive.  
     1, 2,..., j, j+1,…, n 
 
This means that good n will be produced most certainly in East since it has a comparative advantage 
in low-skilled labor. 
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
𝑖
 is the skill premium and depends on the presence of the two production 
factors. When trade is absent, wages are determined by the supply of high- and low-skilled labor for 
each country.  
 
Trade Openness 
A large part of the CEEC exports are labor-intensive and concentrated in low-skill sectors. The 
CEECs are abundant in low-skilled labor and have a comparative advantage in these sectors 
(Crespo & Fontoura, 2001). The CEECs will therefore represent the East while the EU is its trading 
partner. The only way these two differ is in their factor supplies. The CEECs has a comparative 
advantage in low-skilled labor while the EU has a comparative advantage in high-skilled labor. This 
means that the relative price of low-skilled intensive goods is lower in the CEEC compared to the 
EU, while the relative price of high-skilled intensive goods is lower in the EU compared to the 
CEEC. When they open up for trade with each other, profit-seeking firms will look for markets that 
temporarily have the higher price to sell their good. Therefore, the EU will export the high-skilled 
intensive good to the CEECs where prices are higher for this type of good while the CEECs will 
export the low-skilled intensive good to the EU for the same reason. Trade produces a convergence 
of relative prices where prices of the same good will be equalized between countries to a new world 
level. The world price of high-skilled intensive goods will be higher than the post-trade price in the 
EU while lower than the post-trade price in the CEEC. The opposite will hold for low-skilled 
intensive goods.  
 
(1) Seen from the EU perspective, a rise in high-skilled intensive goods raises the purchasing power 
of high-skilled labor while lowering the purchasing power of low-skilled labor in terms of both 
                                                 
8
 Capital and labor can also be used as the two production factors. However, the outcomes will be similar where capital 
has the same outcome as high-skilled labor and labor has the same outcome as low-skilled labor. As I refer to wage 
gaps I have chosen to work with high and low-skilled labor.  
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goods. Wages increase in the high-skilled sector while decrease in the low-skilled sector. Therefore, 
in the EU, individuals working in the high-skilled intensive sector are better off than those in the 
low-skilled intensive sector. This will widen the wage gap and increase income inequality.  
 
(2) From the CEEC perspective, a rise in low-skilled intensive goods raises the purchasing power of 
low-skilled labor while lower it for high-skilled labor. Wages will increase in the low-skilled sector 
while decrease in the high-skilled sector. The wage gap becomes smaller and income inequality will 
fall. This will be seen in the skill premium. 
 
 Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. Wages in the sector using the country’s abundant factor rises 
 while wages in the sector using the country’s scarce factor will decline when countries open 
 up for trade. 
 
This change in relative prices will in turn have effects on the factor prices. Trade flows between the 
CEEC and EU will increase until they both obtain factor price equalization.  
 
 The Factor-Price-Equalization Theorem. Countries producing the same goods with the 
 same technologies and the same factor prices will have the same relative prices when  
 opening up for trade.  
 
The H-O model builds upon several assumptions which are simplifications of reality. There is a 
large diversity of countries in the EU and the model can for example be criticized for assuming 
perfect competition and identical demand functions for all countries. Therefore, the model might be 
somewhat limited in its applicability. However, the model can still be used as a theoretical 
foundation for the analysis regarding the European integration process and brings us to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
As the CEEC become integrated into the EU, the EU15 should experience increased income 
inequality while the CEEC should experience decreased income inequality. 
5.2 International Labor Mobility 
As mentioned above, the integration process of the EU is much more than just eliminating trade 
barriers. It promotes free movement of goods, services, capital but also of people. Migration is 
therefore something that needs to be taken into account. The standard H-O model does not include 
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migration, so I will add a model for international labor mobility to assess the effect when people 
move across borders. 
 
One-Good Model without Factor Mobility 
Similarly to the H-O model, the model assumes two factors of production.
9
 The CEECs are 
abundant in low-skilled labor while the EU is abundant in high-skilled labor. Here, it is assumed 
that only one good is produced, which will be called simply output. The output produced in each 
country is dependent on the quantity of H and L. Since there is no need for trade with only one 
good, the only way these countries can be integrated is through the movement of workers. 
However, this model further assumes that only one of the two factors of production can move 
across borders, in this case the low-skilled labor. Many high-skilled jobs require country-specific 
education, such as lawyers, auditors or controllers which will make high-skilled labor less likely to 
move abroad. High-skilled labor will therefore not move across borders. Low-skilled workers in the 
CEECs will therefore want to move to the EU whenever possible due to higher wages waiting.  
 
International Labor Movement  
Suppose that low-skilled workers now can move freely between the CEECs and the EU. Workers 
will move from the CEEC to the EU for higher wages. This movement will reduce the low-skilled 
labor force in the CEECs and raise wages while increase the low-skilled labor force in the EU and 
lower wages. 
 
Figure 2: Causes and Effects of International Labor Mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This model assumes the same assumptions as in the H-O.  
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The low-skilled workers employed in the CEEC are measured from the right and the low-skilled 
employed in the EU are measured from the left. The left vertical axis shows the marginal product of 
low-skilled labor in the EU and the right vertical axis is for the CEECs. Initially, there are OL1 
workers in the low-skilled sector the CEECs and L1O* workers in the EU. This allocation of 
workers implies that the real wage rate is lower in the CEEC at point C, than the real wage rate in 
the EU at point B. When countries integrate and workers can move freely across borders, they will 
be motivated to move depending on where the higher wage if offered. The low-skilled workers will 
therefore move from the CEECs to the EU until the real wage rates are equalized at point A with 
wage W and both countries holding L2 low-skilled workers. The wage gap in the CEECs has 
declined, as low-skilled labor earns higher wages than before the labor movement. On the other 
hand, the wage gap in the CEECs has increased, as low-skilled labor now earns less than before.  
 
Despite the gains from migration, some people will be hurt by the change. Those who do not 
migrate but remain in the CEECs and work in the low-skilled sector will receive lower wages. The 
model also assumes only one good produced in both economies. When we assume two goods, one 
high-skilled intensive and one low-skilled intensive, countries can export the good they are more 
specified in. Here, trade works as a substitute for factor mobility and coincides with the H-O model. 
In practice, trade is not a perfect substitute to factor movement. Many of the assumptions made are 
not there in reality. There are barriers to trade, both natural and artificial making perfect 
competition impossible. Countries have different technologies as well as demands and no country 
has full employment. One has to be aware of that both the EU and the CEEC are fighting rising 
unemployment rates. Assuming full employment is a large step away from reality. Nevertheless, the 
model still has a fundamental message of the implications of free migration. This theory makes the 
same predictions as the H-O and further supports the hypothesis that:  
 
As the CEEC become integrated into the EU, the EU15 should experience increased income 
inequality while the CEEC should experience decreased income inequality. 
6. Data and Method 
 
The focus in the analysis will be on the impact of economic integration in terms of the eastern 
enlargement on income inequality. I have decomposed economic integration into potential and 
realized integration to capture the whole integration process. Potential integration refers to the 
removal of barriers between countries to make further integration possible, while realized 
integration is the actual change in flows of goods and factors of production as a consequence of the 
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removal of barriers. As mentioned earlier, the analysis will focus on potential integration to assess 
the effects from the eastern enlargement especially on the CEECs but also on the old member 
countries. Realized integration is used as a robustness check. The data included in the analysis is a 
strongly balanced panel for the CEEC sample while unbalance for the EU24 sample. Data differs 
over time, t= 1995, 1996,…, 2013 and countries, i=1,…,24. The main dependent variable used for 
income inequality is the Gini coefficient. The data is and mostly taken from the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) (2014). Some missing values have been replaced by data from the 
World Bank Indicators (2015). The WIID has been created by the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). It consists of several 
inequality statistics from different sources for 160 countries. However, using the WIID one has to 
be aware of the many sources which can lead to difficulties comparing statistics between countries 
and over time. I have therefore tried to collect data from the same source and checked that it does 
not differ too much from the World Bank data. The Gini coefficient takes the value of 1 for perfect 
inequality where all income is held by one individual and 0 when income is perfectly distributed 
among individuals (Worldbank, 2011). The Gini Coefficient captures the within-country inequality 
effect and as the coefficient increases, the more unequal countries become. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the Gini coefficient 
Sample Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
CEEC 170 31.79 4.57 21.2 39.8 
EU15 275 29.22 3.74 20 38.1 
EU24 445 30.20 4.26 20 39.8 
 
Table 3: Average Gini of the CEEC   Table 4: Average Gini for the EU15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Avgerage Gini 
Czech Republic 23.0 
Hungary 25.7 
Slovenia 27.5 
Poland 31.7 
Romania 32.5 
Latvia 34,0 
Lithuania 34.2 
Bulgaria 34.3 
Estonia 37.0 
Country Average Gini 
Denmark 24.2 
Sweden 25.0 
Austria 26.3 
Finland 26.7 
Netherlands 26.8 
Belgium 27.4 
Luxembourg 27.5 
Germany 28.5 
France 28.6 
Ireland 31.1 
Italy 31.5 
United Kingdom 32.7 
Spain 32.9 
Greece 33.9 
Portugal 36.1 
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Table 2 shows from summary statistics for the Gini coefficient.
10
 The difference between the mean 
Gini for the CEEC and EU15 is interestingly not so large. Also, the interval for the Gini coefficient 
is not so different between the CEEC and the old member countries. Table 3 and 4 ranks the 
average Gini for the CEEC and the EU15. For the CEECs, Czech Republic has the lowest average 
coefficient while for the EU15 it is Denmark. Czech Republic actually has a lower coefficient than 
Denmark, which indicates that income inequality is lower in the eastern country than for the 
Scandinavian.  
6.1 Model specification for potential integration 
Potential integration will be represented by an EA-dummy and an EU-dummy. The EA-dummy is 
to control for the Europe Agreements. The CEEC gained some access to the single market before 
officially becoming members of the EU by obtaining these agreements. The dummy will take the 
value of 1 if a country has a Europe Agreement or zero otherwise. The EU-dummy is to control for 
EU membership and will capture the effect of becoming a member. It takes the value of 1 if a 
country is a member of the European Union and zero otherwise. 
 
The specification looks as following:  
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where EA is the dummy variable for Europe Agreements and EU a dummy variable for EU 
membership. The error term has the following structure: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 
Here, 𝜇𝑖 is the country-fixed effect varying for i countries, 𝛾𝑖  the time fixed effect varying over 
time, t, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 error-term varying for i countries over time t. To further control for the effects of the 
old member countries, the following specification will be used: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑁𝑒𝑤 ∗ 𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6(𝑂𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝑈)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑒𝑤 ∗ 𝑛𝑜. 𝐸𝑈)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (3) 
 
where NEW is a dummy variable for the CEECs joining the union in 2004 and 2007.  
                                                 
10
 The Gini coefficients have been scaled up by 100 in the summary statistics for a simpler interpretation.  
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6.2 Model specification for realized integration 
Realized integration is represented by three different variables. The first variable is Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) intensity as percent of GDP and is a useful measure of EU market integration. 
This variable is taken from Eurostat (2015) and is defined as the average of inward and outward 
FDI flows divided by GDP. When the index increases over time, the country is becoming more 
integrated with the international economy. 
 
The second variable is economic openness. This is measured as total imports and exports as percent 
of GDP and is provided by the World Bank World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015). 
Economic openness contributes to the goals of the EU in terms of enhancing economic growth and 
employment and is therefore an important variable of the European integration process (European 
Commission, 2010). The variable has further been used as a contributor for income inequality in 
previous studies (Barro, 2000; Reuveny & Li, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004) The third variable is 
immigration as percentage change and is also taken from Eurostat (2015). Both FDI and 
immigration are representing capital and labor as two factors of production flows between 
countries. The specifications looks as following: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (4) 
 
To control for the effects of the eastern enlargement on the old member countries, the following 
specification will be used: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑂𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝑂𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (5) 
 
Here the old dummy is interacted with the three variables for realized integration to capture the 
integration effect on the old member countries.
11
  
6.3 Control Variables 
The analysis also includes some control variables where all data comes comes from Eurostat (2015) 
if nothing else is stated. GDP per capita (real GDP per capita in 2005 PPP) is included to control for 
the relationship between economic development and inequality, as well as the differences in 
economic development between member countries. The European Union today consists of a 
                                                 
11
 All the regression variables are summarized in Appendix A 
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number of countries, classified between low-income countries and high-income countries and is 
characterize by a large diversity of economies.
12
 For example Bulgaria and Romania are classified 
as low-income economies while Austria and Denmark are classified as high-income economies 
(World Bank, 2015). Expenditure on social protection as percentage of GDP will also be included 
as welfare state effort seems to reduce inequality (Kenworthy, 1999; Korpi & Palme, 1998).  This 
variable includes expenditures on social benefits to households and individuals as well as 
administration costs. Democracy is another covariate that should be added to the analysis. There is a 
literature on democracy and income inequality where most scholars seem to agree on that 
democracy reduces income inequality. Democracy creates opportunities for participation by all 
individuals of a society and promotes equal distribution of income (Reuveny & Li, 2003). The data 
for the democracy variable is taken from the Polity IV Project database. It contains data on political 
regime characteristics and transitions which are based on some institutional factors of a political 
regime. The variable can vary between -10 (hereditary monarchy) and +10 (consolidated 
democracy) (Polity IV, 2014). Finally, I include a dummy representing the adoption of the euro. 
Only some of the member countries are members of the EMU and have adopted the currency at 
different points in time. This dummy is included to control for the integration effect of the euro and 
will take the value of 1 if a country has adopted the euro or zero otherwise. 
 
I am using the Fractional Logit estimator which is a specification of the Generalized Linear Model 
(GLM) to estimate my results. The choice of a GLM method is based on the properties of the 
dependent variable, the Gini coefficient. Since the variable varies between a bounded interval (0 to 
1) it is a continuous variable that can be observed at both ends of the boundaries. An Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) setup is well suited for data taking infinite values. Therefore, using an OLS with my 
data could generate estimates that are outside the bounded interval. The error term is also assumed 
to be normally distributed in an OLS setup. However, a GLM model allows the error term to have 
different distributions. Papke & Wooldridge (1993) recommend the use of a Bernoulli distribution 
and argue that data that is bound between 0 and 1 should be treated as a fraction. The Gini 
coefficient is still related to its regressors through a linear equation, which was laid out above, but 
through a link function. The link function recommended together with the Bernoulli distribution is 
the logit, which generates a logistic regression model.
13
 This is what is called the fractional logit 
estimator.
 14
  
                                                 
12
 Low-income economies are defined and calculated in accordance to the World Bank Atlas method with a GNI per 
capita of $1.045 or less in 2013 (World Bank, 2015).   
13
 A further explanation about the logit link function, see Appendix B 
14
 It would be ideally to further use fixed effect to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity varying over 
countries and time, however, Woolridge (2012) discusses the incidental parameter problem of using cross-sectional 
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When running the regressions I cannot exclude the problem of heteroscedastic error terms in the 
specifications. If heteroskedasticity is present I cannot rely on the t-tests and the significance of my 
estimates. Robust standard errors will be used to take care of this issue.
 
 
7. Results 
 
Before presenting the results it is necessary to mention that it is not the magnitude of the estimates 
that are of importance in this analysis, but rather the signs. Using the Gini coefficient as my 
dependent variable it will be somewhat difficult to interpret the effects in terms of either percentage 
change or unit changes. As I am using the FDI intensity and democracy which both are expressed as 
an index, a one percentage increase generating a percentage change in the Gini coefficient does not 
really mean anything of particular. Moreover, since the fractional logit model gives a logistic 
regression, the magnitudes will again be a bit complicated to interpret. I will therefore focus on the 
signs of the estimates to see whether income inequality has decreased or increased.  
7.1 Results for Potential integration 
Table 5 shows the result for the potential integration specification. Results for the CEEC can be 
seen in column (1)-(3). The EU dummy is positive and highly significant through all regressions. 
This indicates that when the CEECs officially became members of the EU, income inequality 
within these countries increased. Thus, EU membership seems to increase income inequality. This 
is not in line with the hypothesis which stated that income inequality should decrease with 
economic integration for low-skilled countries. The theory which the hypothesis is based on 
predicts that increased trade should benefit the low-skilled sector in the CEECs. However, it might 
be the case that increased trade benefits the high-skilled sector for some reason, widening the wage 
gaps. Or that there are still some barriers left preventing the free movement of low-skilled labor to 
tighten the wage gap. The EA variable is not significant in any regression. It seems that the initial 
process of European integration for the CEECs cannot explain income inequality. However, Egger 
& Larch (2011), found that the EAs had a large effect on both GDP and overall welfare which 
should be seen in the income distribution of the population. Unfortunately, my EA dummy does not 
show any effect at all. A further explanation could be that the removal of barriers from the EAs 
might not have been enough to have an impact on income inequality. The EAs are in many cases 
preparations for future membership of the EU. Even though the CEECs obtained several benefits 
from these agreements, the real effect on income inequality might be what we see in the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                  
dummies and further argues that GLM in a panel data work is almost as efficient as using models that fits population-
average (such as the xtgee command in STATA). Therefore, I have only included year dummies.  
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dummy. Once countries officially become members of the union and get full access to goods 
markets, economic aid, labor markets etc. the integration effect becomes visible on income 
inequality. The euro variable is insignificant together with democracy and social expenditure. On 
the other hand, GDP per capita is negative and highly significant, indicating that increasing GDP 
per capita reduces income inequality within the CEECs.
15
 
 
Table 5: Results for potential integration 
  CEEC 
Specification 
  EU 
Specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini 
       
New    -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.218*** 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
EU 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EA -0.059 -0.059 -0.100 -0.018 -0.018 -0.051*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.062) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Old*no.EA    -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.010) 
New*no.EA    0.005 0.005 0.010 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) 
Old*no.EU    0.005 0.005 0.007** 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
New*no.EU    0.006 0.006 0.007* 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Euro -0.049 -0.048 -0.035 0.009 0.008 -0.011** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.051) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(GDP) -0.303*** -0.283*** -0.301*** -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.062*** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.061) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Democracy  -0.013 -0.008  -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Social expenditure   -0.175   -0.371*** 
   (0.526)   (0.022) 
Constant -0.565*** -0.496*** -0.600*** 0.577*** 0.581*** 0.636*** 
 (0.075) (0.091) (0.161) (0.155) (0.157) (0.068) 
       
Observations 170 170 128 445 444 387 
Deviance 0.904 0.895 0.679 0.470 0.470 0.268 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 It is possible to offer some explanation of the magnitudes by dividing the coefficient with its standard deviation. 
Dividing the coefficient from column (3) with the standard deviation of GDP per capita (0.446) I obtain -0.675. The 
standard deviation measures the shift from the mean value of the dependent variable. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in GDP reduces the Gini coefficient with 0.675 standard deviation away from its mean. Instead of interpreting 
the estimate as a reduction in the Gini coefficient by 30 percent, which does not say much, the magnitude can be shown as a 
shift away from the mean value. 
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The effect of the eastern enlargement on the old countries can be seen from the results in column 
(4)-(6). The New dummy controls for the non-observed heterogeneity in the CEEC countries. It 
picks up the special characteristics for these countries, such as post-dictatorship and planned 
economy that differ from the EU15. The variable shows a negative and highly significant outcome 
which indicates that CEECs generally have lower income inequality than the EU15. This is 
interesting as it could coincide with the fact that the eastern countries for a long time were socialist 
societies built upon the idea of equality. Another explanation could be that these countries have 
lower income levels than the EU15 and that income inequality is lower due to this.  
 
The EU and EA dummies are somewhat difficult to interpret for the EU24 as the EA dummy only 
holds for the CEECs and the old member countries already being members of the EU before the 
beginning of the sample. Both the interaction terms for the number of countries holding EAs are 
insignificant. This raises questions regarding both the model specification and the construction of 
the variable. The construction might be incorrect to really capture the impact of EAs and the 
variable could therefore become an irrelevant variable. On the other hand, the two interaction terms 
controlling for the effect of number of EU members are positive but only weakly significant. As the 
estimates and standard errors are similar for both variables in column (6), a test is performed to see 
whether they differ from each other.
16
 The test indicates that both interaction terms are showing the 
same effect. Thus, the effect of additional number of member countries seems to have a positive 
effect on the Gini coefficient. As the EU is expanding, income inequality will increase both for old 
and new countries. It this case, the eastern expansion in terms of additional member countries has 
raised income inequality in both EU15 countries as well as in the CEECs. Only the interaction term 
for old countries coincides with the hypothesis that inequality should increase in high-skilled 
countries. Furthermore, there could be many reasons for why additional countries lead to inequality. 
One reason could be that regional aid has to be distributed over more countries and that some 
countries receive less than before. For example, this is what France fear for their agricultural sector. 
The variable might also pick up the differences in member countries. For example, the EU15 might 
have been more homogenous in terms of income levels than the EU24 with low-income countries 
entering.  
 
The euro dummy becomes significant in column (6) but strangely changes sign compared to 
previous regressions. One explanation could be that social expenditure was an omitted variable in 
column (4) and (5). The euro variable indicates that sharing the common currency of the EU 
                                                 
16
 The ’lincom’ test in Stata is performed to either reject or accept the null-hypothesis that 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 is zero. The test is 
significant, indicating that the two variables are showing the same effect.  
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reduces income inequality. Joining the EMU is a step towards further integration between the EU 
countries. Therefore, economic integration in this sense reduces income inequality. The GDP per 
capita variable is again negative and highly significant while social expenditure also becomes 
significant in this specification. It is negative, indicating that social expenditures reduce income 
inequality.  
 
Regarding the results for potential integration, the impact of economic integration can only be seen 
through EU membership and number of EU members. The eastern enlargement seems to have 
raised income inequality both for the CEECs and the EU15. These findings are in line with much of 
the previous literature on the impact of European integration on income inequality. For example 
Heidenreich & Wunder (2008) argues that economic liberalization and integration have pushed up 
inequality levels and contributed to increased economic heterogeneity within countries. Joining the 
EU and thereby removing barriers between countries could on the one hand increase trade flows of 
labor movement but in the presence of increased income inequality coming from widening wage 
gaps.  
7.2 Robustness  
As a robustness check I will use realized integration to check whether the impact of economic 
integration differ from the specification for potential integration. The results can be found in Table 
6 and the first three columns are for the CEECs while column (4)-(6) are for the EU24.  
 
Most of the results for the CEECs are insignificant. Immigration is negative and significant in 
column (1) and (3) which indicates that increased immigration flows reduces income inequality. 
This result contradicts the result of the EU dummy. While the EU dummy indicated that economic 
integration should lower income inequality, the immigration variable indicates that when people, 
labor or factors of production can move more freely across borders income inequality should 
decrease. The immigration coefficient is, however, in line with theory that low-skilled labor moves 
to the EU15 driven by higher wages. The immigration variable for the EU24 is also negative, and 
highly significant. Increased immigration flows into the EU24 lowers income inequality for the 
member countries. Unfortunately, none of the interaction variables or the rest of the realized 
integration variables are significant, so it is difficult to draw any conclusion about the impact on the 
old member countries as well as how increased trade flows affects income inequality. The lack of 
significance in the specifications could be due to the construction of the variables or the lack of 
data. As can be seen in the number of observations, they are much fewer than the specification for 
potential integration which points out the lower data availability for some variables. For example 
immigration is one variable reducing the number of observations. 
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Table 6: Results for realized integration 
  CEEC 
Specification 
  EU 
Specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini 
       
New    -0.282*** -0.283*** -0.442*** 
    (0.080) (0.080) (0.089) 
Old*FDI    -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FDI 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Old*Trade    0.047 0.046 0.057 
    (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) 
Trade -0.067 -0.069 -0.077 -0.052 -0.052 -0.089 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) 
Old*Immigration    0.047 0.046 0.007 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) 
Immigration -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Euro 0.047 0.057 0.077 0.043 0.043 -0.044 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Ln(GDP) -0.746*** -0.722*** -0.659*** -0.662*** -0.661*** -0.423*** 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.098) (0.053) (0.053) (0.065) 
Democracy  -0.029* -0.022  -0.002 -0.008 
  (0.016) (0.018)  (0.014) (0.015) 
Social expenditure   -0.684   -1.585*** 
   (0.746)   (0.171) 
Constant 0.838*** 1.029*** 0.952*** 1.062*** 1.081*** 0.935*** 
 (0.151) (0.193) (0.221) (0.155) (0.207) (0.206) 
       
Observations 104 104 101 291 291 268 
Deviance 0.434 0.423 0.412 1.139 1.138 0.861 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All regressions are estimated by adding one control variable at a time to see whether the estimates 
are changing when specific variables are included in the model. Some variables makes other 
variables become insignificant or changing its sign. The problem of omitted variable bias occur 
when one of the variables are either positively or negatively correlated with an omitted variable. In 
that case, the estimates become over- or underestimated. However, most of the variables included in 
the model have been used in previous research. Immigration might be the exception as I base its 
appearance in the model on theory and not previous work. It is not impossible that the estimates 
becomes over- or underestimated in the presence of this variable. Otherwise, I am confident in the 
data used in the analysis as it comes from reliable sources and I therefore exclude any systematic 
measurement problems that can cause biased estimates.  
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Table 7: Fixed effect linear regression 
 CEEC 
specification 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Gini 
  
EU 0.004* 
 (0.002) 
EA -0.022 
 (0.027) 
Euro -0.008 
 (0.027) 
Ln(GDP) -0.101* 
 (0.059) 
Democracy -0.003 
 (0.010) 
Social expenditure -0.021 
 (0.323) 
Constant 0.517*** 
 (0.085) 
  
Observations 128 
R-square 0.692 
Year dummies Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As a second robustness check, the specification for potential integration is estimated in a linear 
fixed effect regression. Table 7 shows that the estimates in terms of sign and significance do not 
change much from the baseline. The coefficients are somewhat smaller. This suggests that my 
baseline specification is reasonable.
17
 
 
It is also worth taking a look at the deviance for the regressions. The deviance is a goodness of fit 
statistic often used when performing maximum likelihood. As the GLM uses maximum likelihood 
estimation, I obtain the deviance and not the classical R-square. The deviance measures the 
variation from the saturated model which is the correct model. The deviance of the saturated model 
is 0. In all specifications, the deviance is declining for each regression which indicates that I am 
coming closer to the correct model.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 A linktest is also perfomed on the baseline specification to see whether link chosen for the model is correct. The test 
shows that the logisticlink I have chosen is the correct link function.  
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8. Discussion 
 
My results provide some insights about the impact of economic integration on income inequality. 
The focus has been on the outcome of the eastern enlargement mostly for the CEECs, but also for 
the EU15. Based on the results for potential integration, only EU membership coincides with 
previous findings by Beckfield (2006) and Heidenreich & Wunder (2008). This result points to a 
negative relationship between economic integration and within-country income inequality in a sense 
that the former seems to increase the latter. One of the goals of the EU is to reduce poverty and 
fight inequality. The CEECs probably hoped to absorb some of the Western European welfare by 
joining the union. Perhaps increased economic growth, access to new markets, open borders or 
more democratic decision making. However, they may have benefited from all this but to the cost 
of increased income inequality. From the EU15 perspective, they too seem to have experienced 
increased income inequality due to additional members. The EU knew that from an economic 
perspective they would not benefit much from the eastern enlargement. They may have been driven 
by political means, being influential on more countries or that they really believed they could help 
these new transition economies. However, the outcome of the eastern enlargement was increased 
income inequality for both partners.  
 
There are several reasons why the EA dummy is not showing any effect. Some has been discussed 
in the result section, for example that the removal of barriers between the CEEC and the EU was 
not enough to have an impact on income inequality. This effect might have been shown later in the 
EU dummy when the CEECs became official members. The main finding in my analysis is that of 
increased inequality with EU membership. This finding is, however, not really in line with theory. 
Both the H-O and the model for International Labor Movement predicts that income inequality 
should increase for the EU while decrease for the CEECs. In this case, inequality increased for both 
partners. The theories are all based on the EU being high-skilled while the CEECs being low-
skilled. Countries are most likely not strictly abundant in one production factor and not strictly 
specialized in one sector. The theoretical models rest on many more assumptions which are 
simplifications of reality. Assuming full employment and absolute free labor movement is not what 
we see in the world today. There are still many barriers for people to move freely across borders 
and most countries suffer to some extent from unemployment. The theories only assume two factors 
of production as well as two goods and may therefore be too simple to explain the complex process 
of European integration taking place.  
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The results from realized integration are unfortunately not very significant. Immigration flows 
seems to reduce income inequality both for CEECs and the whole EU24. However, immigration 
only measures the change of inflows of people. Since I am interested in the outflow of labor from 
the CEECs, an emigration variable could have been included too. Nevertheless, the immigration 
variable indicates that increasing labor flows into the CEECs lowers income inequality. If we 
assume that a large part of the immigration flows do consists of high-skilled labor which was 
assumed to be fixed, this should lower the wage gap between the high- and low-skilled sectors. 
While the results obtained from potential integration were mostly positive and thereby indicating a 
rise in income inequality, the results obtained from realized integration are negative. This could 
indicate that initially removing barriers between people will increase income inequality while the 
result from this removal is lower income inequality. The eastern enlargement probably increased 
heterogeneity in income levels both between and within member countries in the beginning, while a 
reduction in inequality is seen through the increased flows of production factors, goods etc. due to 
the removal of barriers. Unfortunately, the variables for FDI and trade are both insignificant and it 
is therefore difficult to draw any further conclusions.    
 
The model used in this paper is the fractional logit which is a specification of the GLM. The model 
does not assume a normal distributed dependent variable such is done in the OLS, but assumes a 
Bernoulli distribution. Due to the logistic specification, the magnitudes of the results are somewhat 
difficult to interpret. Generally, the odds ratio is used to interpret fractional data, but as my 
dependent variable is not a probability I will rely and focus on the coefficient signs. The downfall 
with this model is that it is not fully compatible with fixed effects. Especially cross-sectional 
dummies cause parameter problems. This is why I have not included country dummies but only 
year dummies. On the other hand Wooldridge (2012), suggests that time averages should be 
included to take care of the unobserved heterogeneity over time. Since I have not done this, but 
included year dummies instead it is possible that my specification generate biased estimates. It is 
possible to run a version of the GLM which is close to the classical fixed effect model, however, 
Wooldrige argues that the GLM is almost as efficient. For future work, this model could have been 
used instead. 
Conclusion 
 
The recent debate about income inequality has lifted economic integration as one possible 
determinant. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between economic integration 
and income inequality by looking at the expansion of the European Union by the Central and 
  32 
Eastern European countries. I used panel data for 9 CEECs and the EU15 between the years 1995 
and 2013. The integration process of the CEECs has been an ongoing process that began in the mid-
90s with access to the single market through the Europe Agreements. They achieved official 
membership in 2004 and 2007 where the union went from 15 to 27 member countries. By using the 
fractional logit specification, I was able to obtain estimates of potential and realized integration on 
the Gini coefficient and provide answers to my hypothesis. It seems that the effect from economic 
integration is mostly channeled through an EU membership. The eastern enlargement has increased 
income inequality both in the CEECs as well as in the EU15. Additional member countries seem to 
raise income inequality for current member countries. This is an important finding since the EU is 
most likely to expand further to the east. However, the current candidate countries for EU 
membership are probably more similar to the CEECs than the CEECs were to the EU15. A future 
EU might therefore be more homogenous than the current union and experience less income 
inequality.  
 
My contribution to the current literature has been twofold. First, I have shown how income 
inequality was affected by the eastern enlargement, both for the CEECs and the EU15. Second, I 
have shown that economic integration is negatively related to income inequality and that my 
findings indicate that the removal of barriers between countries does seem to be one of the driving 
forces of increased income inequality in Europe.  
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Appendix A 
 
Variable description 
Gini = Gini coefficient 
EA = dummy for Europe Agreements 
EU = dummy for European Union membership 
New = dummy for new countries (CEEC) entering 2004 and 2007 
Old = dummy for old countries (EU15) before extension 2004 and 2007 
Old*no.EA =  Old dummy interacted with number of Europe Agreements 
New*no.EA = New dummy interacted with number of Europe Agreements 
Old*no.EU = Old dummy interacted with number of EU members 
New*no.EU = New dummy interacted with number of EU members 
Old*Trade = Old dummy interacted with Trade/GDP 
Old*FDI = Old dummy interacted with FDI intensity 
Old*Immigration = Old dummy interacted with Immigration change 
Euro = dummy for adopting the Euro as currency 
Trade = trade as share of GDP 
FDI = FDI intensity 
Immigration = annual percentage change 
Social expenditure = social expenditure as share of GDP 
Democracy = political regime (Polity IV index) 
Ln(GDP) = log of GDP  
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Appendix B 
 
The classical linear model: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1+, … , +𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝 + 𝜖 
 
The dependent variable y is a linear function of the regressors. In the classical linear model the error 
term is assumed to be normal distributed. GLM allows for other distributions where the error term 
is non-normal. In the GLM, y is still related to the regressions through a linear model, but through a 
link function. The logit function generates a logistic regression model. The dependent variable is a 
zero-one Bernoulli variable whose success probability (the value of the Gini coefficient) 
𝑝(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝) depends on a set of regressors 𝒙 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝) by means of:  
 
𝑝(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝) =  
𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+,…,+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+,…,+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
 
 
The logit function is defined as: 
 
logit (𝑝(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝)) = log[𝑝(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝)/(1 − 𝑝(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝))] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1+, … , +𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝 
 
In a classical linear regression, the link function is simply the linear model (Wright State 
University, 2012).  
